In part 1 I argued that Hodgson’s inability to change his tactics for Euro 2016 was one of three reasons why England failed so dismally. In this segment I am taking a look at the problems faced with personnel selection, specifically the selection of the 23 man squad, by dissecting the balance of the squad and where personnel choices could have been rethought. It could be argued that this approach is rooted in hindsight but, as a disclaimer, I’m not arguing for a personal perspective; rather I have donned my Hodgson cap (it doesn’t fit very well) and tried to figure out why certain players were chosen and where Hodgson could have made changes.

Nothing seems to divide England fans more than team/squad selection; how do you get the right blend between youth and experience? Should an in-form player make the starting eleven even if he doesn’t fit the system? Should you build your team around a set of players that all play together for their club side? Where do you draw the line with injured players? Seemingly all timeless questions, but no less relevant given the outcome of England’s two year qualifying cakewalk. Come the tournament however, the bottom line was that the balance of the squad remained all wrong, and therefore it became all the more difficult for Hodgson to answer the aforementioned questions with definitive performances from a starting eleven. I am adamant that Hodgson firmly believed he was picking the best twenty-three players at his disposal, with a vague idea of how he wanted to play each individual but importantly I don’t think he had given much thought to how each individual would fit into the collective. Admittedly, I could single out individuals in both attack, defence and goalkeeper, but the underlying problem when it came to selecting the 23 was the balance in midfield and the uncertainty in defence.

In total I calculate that we had seven players in the squad that would consider themselves central midfielders or played in central midfield (a certain Wayne Rooney is included) with only one conventional winger (Sterling) and another who plays wide in an attacking three for his club (Lallana). I have thought long and hard on this area of his squad selection and how unbalanced it was. It couldn’t simply be because Roy didn’t like or trust certain players (individuals such as Oxlade-Chamberlain, although injured for Euro 2016) or Walcott and Townsend who had all become established stewards during Hodgson’s reign. In order to find answers I had to cast my mind back to the World Cup 2014, which was a tournament where the central midfield battle often decided the result of the match, for example Germany vs Brazil or Chile vs Spain. However in the context of England, Hodgson would have seen Henderson and Gerrard overrun in midfield trying to protect a fragile defence against both Italy and Uruguay. It resulted in an exit within 6 days, the worst in our World Cup history. He was not prepared to let that happen again, especially with a continuation of a shaky defence and an attack that was presumed to sort itself out. Thus seven central midfielders were taken to add options to both our flair and steel resources. Based on that rationale, I can totally understand why Hodgson felt it important to take such options in midfield; however, an increased number of options does not necessarily generate an increased quality of options. 

Now, it is as clear as crystal that Jack Wilshere was the odd man out amongst fans and pundits; a contentious pick before, during and after the tournament. He added no clear quality to a team that was desperately crying out for some. Hodgson picked him out of loyalty and a belief that he could mirror England’s two time tournament tormenter – Andrea Pirlo. But the problem was threefold; firstly, Wilshere style of play differs markedly from Pirlo’s. Secondly, the Wilshere experiment in holding midfield was made redundant in the face of Eric Dier’s emergence, who always looked a more natural fit in that position. Lastly, he wasn’t fit, and therefore was always likely to find crosshairs aimed in his direction. Henderson unfortunately also falls into the same category as Wilshere, suffering from too many players in the same position and still reeling from a niggle picked up towards the end of the season. Henderson remains a tireless worker who provides energy, but who didn’t deserve to be in the squad. Hodgson could have easily filled those places in the squad with Delph or Drinkwater if he wanted to continue to keep the same balance, but we’ve already established in part 1 that Hodgson wanted to play 4-3-3 and therefore two like for like swaps would not have made a blind bit of difference, despite acknowledgement of Drinkwater’s fantastic season with the champions. Instead, the logical decision was for Hodgson to take Townsend and Walcott, two wingers, or players that had at least been accustomed to running the channels. Admittedly, the latter’s form was not ideal but neither was Sterling’s for example. International managers have no control over a player’s club form nor can they simply go out and spend a cool 30 million on a new one. They have to work within the parameters given, and if that means picking an out of form player if that player fits into a problem position or suits the way you want to play then so be it. On this logic the decision to take Walcott and Townsend over Wilshere and Henderson made total footballing sense even taking into account Hodgson’s reservations. 

The other glaring error in terms of selection was the absence of a left footed centre back. Undeniably, the talent pool for English left footed centre backs is extremely shallow and therefore a comprehensive search would see you delve further and further down the football pyramid. Nevertheless, an obvious option presented itself, despite the baggage that came with it and the necessity of coercing him out of International retirement. John Terry, regardless of his non-professional exploits and less than tender years has been playing as the left sided centre back for Chelsea for the best part of over a decade. He would have brought an experience that was lacking in a youthful backline and in doing so shored up the left side of defence. Hodgson would have known this though, and would have ultimately judged the political ramifications of such a call up as outweighing the football reasons, even assuming that Terry would have accepted such a call to arms. But I bet you that at half-time in the Iceland game, after seeing England fall behind to two goals that came down the left side of defence, Hodgson would have there and then taken up the gamble of Terry simply for the leadership, experience and knowhow of the position that he would have provided.  

Ultimately, the actual selection of the 23 man squad was made to look a lot worse than it actually was due to the tactical system played; it singled out certain players such as Wilshere and Sterling as liabilities when there were far more wide ranging factors at work. That said, the selection of seven central midfielders in the squad (and then Hodgson to decide to play Rooney in midfield anyway!) seemed like madness. England needed more width from their personnel, so sacrificing Henderson and Wilshere – who were both recovering from injuries – for Townsend and Walcott may have alleviated that problem and provided options in place of the misfiring Raheem Sterling and the false wide player Adam Lallana. Taking three defenders was another grievous decision after the Cult of Rory Delap seemed to influence both Iceland and England in the round of 16 encounter. It may surprise you, but it is my view that that the 23 man selection was largely correct. Despite my earlier protestations that Hodgson picked individuals and not a squad, there is nothing wrong with picking individuals as long as you still remain a balance and structure to the squad, which the squad sadly lacked. Two or three changes are possibly all it would have taken; such fine margins, but then again it goes without saying that it is those fine margins that decide the fate of International mangers, and boy was this no clearer than with Hodgson. 

Who Hodgson did pick: Hart, Forster, Heaton, Rose, Walker, Bertrand, Clyne, Stones, Cahill, Smalling, Dier, Barkley, Alli, Wilshere, Milner, Henderson, Lallana, Sterling, Rooney, Sturridge, Kane, Rashford, Vardy.

Who Hodgson could and should have picked: Hart, Forster, Heaton, Rose, Walker, Bertrand, Terry, Stones, Cahill, Smalling, Dier, Barkley, Alli, Walcott, Milner, Townsend, Lallana, Sterling, Rooney, Sturridge, Kane, Rashford, Vardy.

Italicised players correspond to changes